site.btaIvan Hadjiiski Institute Identifies "Structural Insecurity" in the World

Sofia, January 8 (BTA) - In its analysis of 2017, the Ivan Hadjiiski Institute highlights 18 important things one ought to know about the world and Bulgaria at the start of 2018.

1. War around the corner: The decisive step towards peace and easing of tensions is yet to be made. There is structural insecurity. In 2016 the wind of change picked up in a way similar to 1989. The results of global dynamics were evident in 2017: we live in an increasingly insecure world. International tension has reached critical levels. The world has never been closer to a new military conflict with unpredictable consequences.

2. Towards a multipolar world and consolidation of the non-West: 2017 saw further progress made towards a multipolar constellation. We are witnessing a new phase of globalization. The non-Western world is gaining upward momentum. The general trend is global multipolarity. US-China competition and the improvement in Russia-China relations are important factors.

3. A divided West: There are serious divides in the Western world - both within the global leader, the United States, and between the US and its traditional European allies.

4. The Middle East and Pandora's box: A hard-to-control process of shifting borders in the Middle East (and to some extent in North Africa) may open Pandora's box. The Middle East's conviction that Washington encourages the Kurds' ambition to have their own state further distances some Middle East countries form the US.

5. Dismantling Obama, consolidating Trump: The pillars of Obama's international policy (except the confrontation with Russia) have been torn down: the rapprochement with Cuba and Iran, the souring relations with Israel, the climate change agreement, the solid support for Syrian rebels, the priority set on Ukraine and Caucasus, and the arduous efforts towards the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The conservative wave sweeping the West is a reaction to globalization.

6. A hay-day for Russia? The war in Syria, the turnaround in Russia's relations with Turkey and Turkey's rapprochement with Iran are successes for Moscow's foreign policy ambitions. Russia is gaining serious ground in the Middle East as the West seems to be losing ground. However, the opposite is taking place in the Balkans.

7. Or rather a hay-day for China: The financial and economic dimensions of the Belt and Road Initiative are taking shape, and its political dimension, the 16+1 format, reflects China's opening towards Eastern Europe.

8 Europe - back to East and West, or to conservative and liberal: The EU's ideological divide is between conservatism and liberalism. Its geopolitical divide is between Eastern and Western Europe. A strong conservative wave dominates Eastern Europe, while the West, where liberalism is predominant, is seeing conservative "breakthroughs" which show that the election victories over populism and nationalism are far from final.

9. The systemic parties are being radicalized, while radical parties are entering the mainstream: In Western Europe systemic parties are gradually mastering nationalism and conservatism, while in Eastern Europe conservative and nationalist parties are entering the mainstream.

10. The Western Balkans and the difference between the German and the Anglo-Saxon approach. Where are we? The German vision for the Western Balkans reflected in the Berlin Process is in favour of a slow, gradual intraregional economic and political integration. The Anglo-Saxon approach, which is in favour of speedy integration, first in NATO and then in the EU, is coming to the fore. In this context Bulgaria's decision to refer to its EU Presidency as "Balkan" is a rather bold move.

11. Bulgaria - good relations with all. This country has chanced on a political course of maintaining good relations with those near and far: with the US; with the EU; with Turkey; with Saudi Arabia; with Qatar, etc. Tangible progress was made with Macedonia, as well as in the quadrilateral dialogue with Serbia, Greece and Romania. At the same time key priorities, such as Bulgaria's entry in the Schengen area and "the waiting room" of the Eurozone and exiting the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism are yet to happen.

12. The unbearable lightness of the EU Presidency: Bulgaria will have to participate convincingly in decision-making about the future EU-UK relations, the enhanced integration scenarios and the Visegrad alternatives, the Brussels-Warsaw confrontation, ideas for new migration regulations and a new approach to Russia, the risks of failing to implement the EU's deal with Turkey, the offers to the Western Balkans, the EU's budget framework and Cohesion Policy in the post-2020 programming period.

13. (Almost) full conservative victory in Bulgaria: Conservatism is growing stronger while liberalism is waning. Stability, not reform, is a priority. Bulgarians value stability but a change in the status quo still is high in their expectations. Both the ruling GERB and the opposition Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) have filled conservative niches (and for GERB stability has become an end in itself).

14. GERB's creeping concentration of power: Political and business alternatives to the power model which emerged in recent years are being systematically pushed out.

15. GERB's new strategy: Similarly to 2009, GERB is fighting both the old Right and the old Left in an ostensible attempt to revise the transition. GERB tried to discredit the right wing (through its media symbol Ivo Prokopiev) and the left wing (through BSP leader Kornelia Ninova) with muck-raking about the privatization respectively of Kaolin and Technoimpex.

16. BSP: an alternative to power or an alternative to the model? Ninova team has forced GERB into a mode of daily explanations and excuses, and has moved into a territory previously reserved for the old Right: the rule of law and the fight against corruption. Against the backdrop of the ambiguous conduct of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms and Volya, the BSP is the only real parliamentary alternative to the power holders. Still, GERB and the BSP seem to have few differences on a number of sectors of governance. The BSP is faced with the difficult transition from "an alternative to power" to "an alternative to the model".

17. The United Patriots - the advantages of paradox: Coalition leaders Krassimir Karakachanov, Valeri Simeonov and Volen Siderov have many differences (as seen in the government), but not standing in each other's way and sticking to separate tracks - which they did - mattered most to them. The most contentious cabinet member, Deputy Prime Minister Valeri Simeonov, is most useful to them because his rash statements sustain the coalition's non-mainstream image, though his efforts rarely go beyond his statements.

18. Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF): the risks of rapprochement. Just as the nationalist pathos of the nationalist coalition is waning, the anti-Erdogan MRF sees the growing importance of relations with Erdogan. If it is to stay united, the MRF cannot be in conflict with Turkey for too long. However, the signs of rapprochement from Ankara pose a risk of an external takeover.



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